In this paper, I attempt to distinguish four linguistic concepts: fuzziness, vagueness, generality and ambiguity. The distinction between the four concepts is a significant matter, both theoretically and practically. Several tests are discussed from the perspectives of semantics, syntax and pragmatics. It is my contention that fuzziness, vagueness, and generality are licensed by Grice's Co-operative Principle, i.e. they are just as important as precision in language. I conclude that generality, vagueness, and fuzziness are under-determined, and ambiguity is over-determined. Fuzziness differs from generality, vagueness, and ambiguity in that it is not simply a result of a one-tomany relationship between a general meaning and its specifications; nor a list of possible related interpretations derived from a vague expression; nor a list of unrelated meanings denoted by an ambiguous expression. Fuzziness is inherent in the sense that it has no clear-cut referential boundary, and is not resolvable with resort to context, as opposed to generality, vagueness, and ambiguity, which may be contextually eliminated. It is also concluded that fuzziness is closely involved with language users' judgments. An important implication of this is that for meaning investigations, an integral approach combining semantics, pragmatics, and psycholinguistics would be more powerful and beneficial.
Introduction
In this paper, the distinction between fuzziness, generality, vagueness, and ambiguity will be discussed primarily from the perspectives of semantics, syntax, and pragmatics. More attention has been paid in the linguistic literature to generality, vagueness, and ambiguity than to fuzziness. Fuzziness remains an underdeveloped area, but one that is important to explore.
Although some work has been done on the matter (e.g. Kempson, 1977; Geeraerts, 1993; Tuggy, 1993; Kooij, 1971; and McCawley, 1981) , considerable confusion between the four above-mentioned concepts still exists. Vagueness and fuzziness, in particular, have been used interchangeably by some investigators. For instance, at the beginning of this century, Peirce (1902: 748) gave as his definition of vagueness: "A proposition is vague when there are possible states of things concerning which it is intrinsically uncertain whether, had they been contemplated by the speaker, he would have regarded them as excluded or allowed by the proposition.'' This definition of vagueness fits the characteristic of fuzziness in my terms (see Section 1.1). On the other hand, some researchers define vague in a different sense, such as Ullmann (1962) and Kempson (1977) . Kempson also considers the concept of vagueness a superset of the concept of fuzziness.
Our discussion here also has some practical implications. For example, confusing ambiguity with the other three concepts may create problems for lexicographers, as it becomes difficult for them to decide whether a word in a borderline case should have one or more than one dictionary entry.
All four concepts share the characteristic of conveying imprecise/unspecified information, but the way they do this differs, and this is the focal point of this paper. Our discussion will also show some theoretical implications.
Definitions
In this section, four concepts are defined---fuzziness, generality, vagueness, and ambiguity.
Fuzziness
Suppose this might happen in real life. While preparing a party, Mary asked John to buy about 20 beers and a few apples. John had to decide exactly how many beers and apples he would buy. In the shop, he hesitated for a while, then bought 18 beers and five apples. Once Mary saw the things John bought she seemed satisfied. Although this is a hypothetical example of a communication using words like a few and about 20, in fact this kind of communication happens very often in our everyday life. If we closely examine our language, most expressions have a fuzzy 2 referential boundary. For instance, an essay could be not bad, a girl may be rather pretty, a pile of papers may be 20 or so, and someone may have many friends. I will use fuzzy as a technical term, which excludes the negative part of its literal meaning, like misused, mistaken, or not well defined. It appears that the term fuzzy sometimes confuses people, so it has been suggested that the term continuous could replace the term fuzzy. For example, fuzzy logic (Zadeh, 1965) could be called continuous logic. However, it seems to me that whatever the concept is called makes little difference, as long as we keep it well defined.
In the same vein, Crystal (1991: 148) defines fuzzy as:
"... a term derived from mathematics and used by some LINGUISTS to refer to the INDETERMINACY involved in the analysis of a linguistic UNIT OR PATTERN. For example, several LEXICAL ITEMS, it is argued, are best regarded as representing a SEMANTIC CATEGORY which has an INVARIANT core with a variable (or `fuzzy') boundary, this allowing for flexibility of APPLICATION to a wide range of entities, given the appropriate CONTEXT. The difficulty of defining the boundaries of cup and glass has been a well-studied example of this indeterminacy. Other items which lend `fuzziness' to language include sort of, rather, quite, etc." [Capitals in original for purposes of cross-reference]
Crystal says that fuzzy is derived from the fuzzy mathematics developed by Zadeh (1965) . Zadeh suggests that fuzziness can be formally handled in terms of a fuzzy set, a class of entities with a continuum of grades of membership. Such a set is characterized by a membership function (characteristic), which assigns to each entity a grade of membership ranging between zero and one, notated as [0, 1]. Lakoff (1973) , as well as McCawley (1981) , applies Zadeh's fuzzy set theory to the study of meaning. Lakoff points out that there is a certain degree of fuzziness around componential boundaries. If we consider bird-likeness, it appears that robin is a central member, as it belongs to bird-likeness completely. Bat is a peripheral member, as it hardly belongs to bird-likeness. Thus, a better way of representing the meaning of birdlikeness, especially the referential meaning of it, is to rank relevant members as to the degree of their bird-likeness---the degree to which they match the core member of birdlikeness. Here is a bird-likeness hierarchy, reproduced from Lakoff (1973) 
Generality
The meaning of an expression is general in the sense that it does not specify certain details; i.e. generality is a matter of unspecification. For example: the meaning of city is general because it does not specify whether or not a city is big or small, modern or ancient. My friend is general, as it could mean a female friend, a male friend, or just a friend from New Zealand.
Let us now examine the following sentences: a. Mary saw John. b. Mary changed a baby. c. Mary received a degree.
( 1.3)
The meaning of sentence (a) is general because it does not specify whether or not Mary saw John in a shop, or in a school, or any other place. In (b), Mary could be changing her own baby, or a baby belonging to her husband's ex-wife, or a baby she had kidnapped. The question of whose the baby it is, is left open. In (c), Mary could have an art degree, or a science degree; a BA degree, or a Ph.D degree. Again, the sentence does not say specifically what kind of degree Mary received.
Vagueness
Vagueness is defined here as an expression which has more than one possible interpretation (i.e. is polysemous There is a great diversity among linguists in defining fuzziness, generality, vagueness, and ambiguity. As an illustration, here is how Kempson (1977: 124-128 ) defines four types of what she calls vagueness:
(1) Referential vagueness, where the meaning of a lexical item is in principle clear enough, but it may be hard to decide whether or not the item can be applied to certain objects; (2) Indeterminacy of meaning, where the meaning of an item itself seems indeterminate; (3) Lack of specification in the meaning of an item, where the meaning is clear but is only generally specified; (4) Disjunction in the specification of an item's meaning, where the meaning involves an either-or statement with different interpretation possibilities.
What happens in (1) Let us look at Kempson's example, John's sheets, to illustrate (2): indeterminacy of meaning. The expression may be used to describe not only the sheets John owns, or the sheets he has made or designed, but also the sheets which go on the bed in which he is sleeping. John's sheets, taken in isolation, allow for several possible interpretations; hence there is indeterminacy of meaning. The example is used by Kempson to illustrate the phenomenon of one term (e.g. John's sheets) having different possible interpretations, as shown in Fig. (1a) Fig. (1b) , a solid line (e.g. E 3 ) denotes a typical member, and a dotted line indicates a less typical member, Science B.V. in New York & Amsterdam), 1998, 29 (1): pp 13-31. such as the case in which John and Mary bought the sheets together, but John only paid 45% of the total amount. In this case, John's ownership is not a clear-cut one.
In addition, the indeterminacy of meaning of John's sheets in Fig. (1a) could be resolved in context. We may be able to pick up one of those interpretations which fits in a certain context. On the other hand, for Fig. (1b) context may not resolve fuzziness (see Section 5.2 for a further discussion on contextual effects).
As to (3), lack of specification, Kempson says: "The simplest example of lack of specification is an item like neighbor which is unspecified for sex, or for that matter, race, or age, etc. It can be applied to people as disparate as a tiny, five-foot Welshman studying Philosophy, and a six-foot Ghanaian girl who has seven children and who only did four years' schooling''. In fact, it appears to me that this is a type of generality (see Section 1.2 for more discussion on this).
There is a distinction between unspecified and fuzzy. The concept of unspecified denotes an expression not constituting or falling into a specifiable category, whereas the concept of fuzziness means an expression having an uncertain extensional denotation. For instance, Kempson calls the expression neighbor unspecified in terms of sex, age or race. I would rather say that the expression is fuzzy, because we do not know whether or not a person living one mile away is a neighbor. Fuzziness is a matter of whether or not an entity is denoted by an expression; it does not touch upon the nature of the entity. As far as the example of neighbor is concerned, it can be either unspecified (as Kempson implies) or fuzzy (as I imply).
For type (4), disjunction, Kempson discusses or in the sentence The applicants for the job either had a first-class degree or some teaching experience. The implication that or contributes to the sentence is that one of the two conjuncts, or possibly both, are true. That is to say that or in this instance may or may not be used in the inclusive sense: an applicant could have a first-class degree, or some teaching experience, or both. Then, the sentence given would be either true or false. This is indeed a case of vagueness in my terms as defined in Section 1.3 above. It would not be a case of fuzziness, because a fuzzy sentence such as About 200 students left would have a degree of truth.
To conclude, of Kempson's four types of vagueness only type (1) presents a clear case of fuzziness in my terms, being characterized by having no precise reference for an expression. Types (2) and (4) are cases of vagueness, whereas type (3) is one of generality. Fine (1975) also explores fuzziness, ambiguity and generality by discussing some hypothetical examples. Suppose that the meanings of predicates, nice 1 , nice 2 , nice 3 , are given by the following clauses:
(1) (a) n is nice 1 iff n > 15, (b) n is not nice 1 iff n < 13; (2) (a) n is nice 2 iff n > 15, Science B.V. in New York & Amsterdam), 1998, 29 (1): pp 13-31.
Predicate nice 1 is fuzzy, because it is under-determined. As shown in (1), n is nice 1 iff n > 15 and n is not nice 1 iff n < 13. That is, the range from 13 to 15 is a gray area; we do not know whether or not this area belongs to nice 1 . To give an example, The students' number is about 200, we might say that 199 is definitely about 200 and 500 is definitely not about 200, but we are less certain whether or not 290 is about 200.
On the other hand, nice 2 is ambiguous, because it is over-determined. Namely, if n is nice 2 iff n > 15 and n is nice 2 iff n > 14, then nice 2 could have two values simultaneously, i.e. 14 and 15. A term that has two values at the same time is overdetermined. For example, bank is ambiguous because it has two readings: the rising ground bordering a lake or river, or a financial institution.
Finally, nice 3 is highly unspecific, because n is nice 3 iff n > 15. That is to say, any number above 15 is nice 3 , its meaning thus is general (the meaning of item is considered to be general when it does not specify the nature of the entities it denotes).
Semantic tests
In this section, we primarily examine semantic evidence.
One or more than one meaning
An ambiguous expression has more than one meaning, and they are semantically unrelated. Consequently, ambiguous words tend to have separate dictionary entries. As an illustration, the Chinese word mi3 is ambiguous, as it means either rice or meter; thus it has two entries in, for example, Modern Chinese Dictionary (1979: 773, Beijing: The Commercial Press). The two senses are not semantically related in any way.
A vague expression has one meaning but more than one interpretation, and the interpretations are semantically related. Thus, a vague word tends to have a single dictionary entry. For example, the Chinese vague word kan4 has different interpretations: kan4 dian4shi4 'to watch TV'; kan4 shu1 'to read a book'; kan4 peng2you 'to visit a friend', etc., but only one dictionary entry in Modern Chinese Dictionary (ibid.: 625). The interpretations are all derived from the meaning of kan4---an action involving some kind of eye motion.
Similarly, a general or a fuzzy expression has only one meaning. For example, the Chinese word ren2 'person' has only one general sense, and it does not specify sex, height, or nationality. Also, the Chinese word gao1 'tall' has one single sense, and any reference derived from this sense is undecided. 
Referential or non-referential
As defined above, one distinct characteristic of fuzziness is that it has no clear-cut referential applicability. Take tallness as an example: its general or definitional meaning may be defined as a greater height than a norm or an average; thus, it is not fuzzy. Fuzziness emerges when we try to work out the concept's reference. That is, there is indeterminacy about whether or not a certain entity in the real world belongs to the semantic domain denoted by tall. How tall is tall? The norm of tallness varies, depending on many non-linguistic factors. A tall female may not be tall, compared to a standard for male; in turn, a tall male may not be tall compared to a tall professional male basketball player; a tall Chinese man may not be tall according to the New Zealand standard, etc. It appears that the reference of tallness is not clear-cut; hence it has to be pragmatically determined, if it can be determined at all.
On the other hand, ambiguity, generality, and vagueness are not much a matter of the referential meaning. They are more to do with sense or interpretation than with reference. For example, when talking about an ambiguous word, say bank, we refer to its two distinct senses. For a vague word, e.g. good, a number of possible interpretations would be in focus. A general word, e.g. person, is unspecified in terms of its sense, not as to its referential boundary.
Let us now have a look at fuzziness and vagueness. A fuzzy expression is defined as an expression which has no clear-cut referential boundary. By contrast, a vague expression is defined as an expression which has more than one related interpretation, and the question of whether or not these interpretations have a clear-cut boundary is simply irrelevant. For instance, the referential boundary of about 200 is not determinate, but rather a matter of fuzziness. On the other hand, vagueness concerns more than one related interpretation. For example, John's book has the following possible interpretations: the book John owns, the book John wrote, the book he has been reading, the book he was carrying when he came into the room, etc. Whether or not these interpretations have a clear-cut boundary is not a relevant matter as far as vagueness is concerned. However, when we talk about the fuzziness of John's book, we would have to decide whether or not the denotation of a possible interpretation of John's book is determinate. For instance, the book John wrote is fuzzy, because (co-)authorship is fuzzy: for example, in the case of several authors, how much of the book would John have to write to become its author?
Syntactic tests
In this section, I will consider a number of tests based on syntactic evidence.
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The identity test
A verb phrase pro-form test (e.g. Lakoff, 1970) The VP-deletion that occurs in these sentences requires identity, at least sloppy identity, of senses between the two conjuncts. Sentence (a) means either 'I went to a riverside this morning; Mary went to a riverside, too' or 'I went to a financial institution this morning; Mary went to a financial institution, too'; but not 'I went to a riverside this morning, Mary went to a financial institution'. The reason is that the two senses of bank here are not semantically related at all, so they cannot be used in one single sentence, due to their incompatibility. By contrast, (b), a vague sentence, could mean 'I have eaten some soup, Mary has eaten some bread', where 'eat (some soup)' in the first conjunct and 'eat (some bread)' in the second conjunct are compatible semantically. Similarly, the fuzzy sentence (c) can mean 'I am 5' 9'', Mary is 6' 1''', where 5' 9'' and 6' 1'' are both denoted by tall. Finally, (d) is a sentence containing a general expression friend without specification of sex, nationality, etc. The sentence works in the same way as (b) and (c), in that it may mean, e.g. 'I have a Chinese friend, Mary has a New Zealand friend'. Both 'Chinese friend' and 'New Zealand friend' are denoted by the general expression friend, so the two expressions are not incompatible semantically.
It must be emphasized that this VP-deletion requires identity of senses between the two conjuncts, rather than identity of interpretations or references. If it required identity of interpretation or reference, then at least (b) and (c) would have failed the test, because its two conjuncts are not interpretatively or referentially identical. That is, for (c) one reference of tall (5'9'') is not equivalent to the other reference (6'1'') 5 .
The contradiction test
A contradiction test has been proposed to test ambiguity (e.g. Zwicky and Sadock, 1975 & Channell, 1994 meaning. Hence, the odds are that, when a 'How' question is asked with no precise answer being given (or even possible), we are dealing with fuzziness.
The hedge test
A hedge word is defined here as a word that brings in a fuzzy reading (e.g. around in around two o'clock), or modifies fuzziness to an extent (e.g. very in very many). For example, two o'clock could be precise on its own 6 , but it becomes fuzzy when combined with around. Hedges such as about, or so, -odd, almost, -ish, nearly behave in the same way as around in that they bring in a fuzzy reading. Also, the degree of fuzziness of He is tall can be modified by hedges. For example, very in He is very tall pushes the degree upwards; while somewhat in He is somewhat tall pushes the value downwards. Lakoff (1973) , Channell (1994) , and Zhang (1996) discuss the matter of hedges at length.
It appears that a test using a hedge can single out fuzziness. My assumption is that any expressions which may be modified by a hedge are fuzzy in nature. In other words, fuzziness can be tested by adding a hedge, such as about, or so, sort of, very or somewhat. A prerequisite for this kind of test is that the meaning of an expression can be measured in degrees, i.e. it must be able to be scaled. Let We may conclude that using an expression like kind of in answering a yes/no question indicates that it is fuzziness that is in focus, since only fuzzy expressions allow a scalar reading.
Homonymy and polysemy
Let us start by discussing the concepts of word and lexical item. It is considered in this paper that the set of lexical items is a subset of the superset of words. For instance, there is one word tap, but there are two lexical items: to give someone a tap on the shoulder, and a water tap. The Chinese word hui4 has at least two lexical items: ability and a meeting. Moreover, each lexical item can be divided into different semes. For example, the lexical item hui4 'ability' has at least two semes: can and understand.
At the level of words, if a word corresponds to more than one unrelated lexical item, then we speak of homonymy. An example of homonymy is the word tap, since its two lexical items, as mentioned above, are not semantically related. At the level of semes, if the semes derived from the same lexical item are semantically related to each other, then we call this polysemy. Consider the Chinese word hui4 in the following sentences:
Fuzziness-vagueness-generality-ambiguity. The two semes---can and understand---in (a) and (b) represent two related semes: presumably, if one can do something, then one also understands what one is doing. The taxonomy in Fig. 2 illustrates homonymy and polysemy, using the Chinese word hui4: Between the three levels of word, the lexical item, and seme, two relations obtain: homonymy and polysemy. Homonymy is a property of a word represented by the relation between its lexical items. Polysemy is a property of a lexical item represented by the relation between its semes. The question is how these three levels and two relations are connected to the distinction between ambiguity, vagueness, generality, and fuzziness. Let us examine It appears that ambiguity exists on the word level and is connected with homonymy only, e.g. the word bank, illustrated in Fig. 3 . Vagueness, on the other hand, is represented by polysemy, as mouth in Fig. 3 . Fuzziness is also not connected to homonymy. For instance, fuzziness between dark red and pale red exists in terms of polysemy under red. In terms of levels, fuzziness and vagueness may occur at all three levels---the word, the lexical item, and the seme.
With regard to generality, this may occur with a word, a lexical item, or a seme (as in the case of person). Here, the matter of homonymy vs. polysemy appears not to be relevant. For example, person is general because it does not specify sex, height, nationality, etc. Thus, generality has no connection with the two discussed phenomena.
Finally, ambiguity has two forms: syntactic and lexical. To take an example of syntactic ambiguity: the sentence Young men and women came to the party has at least two readings. Since generality, vagueness, and fuzziness are primarily involved with meaning per se, different syntactic structures do not produce general/vague/fuzzy meanings. This further differentiates ambiguity from the rest.
Pragmatic tests
A discussion of pragmatic factors helps us to further identify the distinction among ambiguity, vagueness, generality, and fuzziness, as there are some testable differences between the four concepts with respect to pragmatics.
Language users' judgments
Fuzziness has to do with language users' different judgments. For example, the sentence Grace is beautiful may be true as far as John is concerned, but it may not be quite true according to Mary's standards. Hence, individually differing judgments may create fuzziness.
On the other hand, vague, general, and ambiguous meanings do not depend on an individual's judgment, as least not as much as does fuzziness. For example, in working out the truth value of the sentence Grace went to a bank, we depend primarily on whether or not Grace went to a bank (a riverside or a financial institution). An individual such as Mary or John's judgment does not count much here. Similarly, as far as the general meaning of person (e.g. woman or man) or the vague meaning of good (e.g. a good student or good food) is concerned, our individual judgments do not play a significant role. For example, in the sentence I need a person to help me with this, whether this person is male or female will not affect its truth value; our judgments have no business here. Also, among the possible interpretations of good are a good (student), good (food), good (legs), etc.; again, this vagueness does not depend on people's judgments. For example, in the sentence John is good at doing his studies, we would not disagree that this means: good as in a good student, rather than good as in the case of good food. Science B.V. in New York & Amsterdam), 1998, 29 (1): pp 13-31.
The point being made here is that fuzziness is more closely related to language users' judgments than are vagueness, generality, and ambiguity. For example, bank is ambiguous not because of people's different judgments, but because it has two senses, and thus is ambiguous in its own right. However, beauty is fuzzy due to the fuzziness of the concept it denotes, to the fuzzy nature of language users' perceptions on its referential boundary, etc. This implies that when we study fuzziness, we may also take certain nonlinguistic factors into account. (For further discussion, see Zhang (1996) .)
Context
From what was stated in the last section, viz., that fuzziness has to do with our individual judgments, it follows that fuzziness may not be 'defuzzified' by a linguistic context alone; whereas disambiguation, 'de-vaguefying', or 'de-generalisation' could be done in and by a linguistic context. The reason is that it is difficult for human beings to reach an agreement on the referential applicability of fuzzy expressions.
The elimination of ambiguity can be carried out if an ambiguous word occurs in a given context. For example, punch is ambiguous in isolation, but it may not be ambiguous in a given context. Punch means to hit in I was punched by him; or a kind of drink in I made gallons of rum punch for the party. Channell (1994: 35) argues correctly that ambiguity is rarely a factor in real communication, because hearers read off a meaning without even realizing that there could have been another one. Grice's (1975) Co-operative Principle assumes, at its simplest, that language users follow four rules for conversation: the maxim of Quality (be truthful, according to the information one has); the maxim of Quantity (be informative, but not overinformative); the maxim of Relevance (be relevant to the conversation) and the maxim of Manner (be clear and brief ).
The relevance of the four maxims to our discussion is that they may license generality, vagueness, and fuzziness, but not ambiguity. For example, although the meaning of Mary is tall is fuzzy, and Mary hit me is general in terms of intentionality (i.e. whether or not she hit me on purpose), we use such expressions in communicating and have no problem with them. The reason is that these kinds of sentence comply with Grice's maxims. Saying Mary is tall is co-operative because one either may try to be truthful, as one who genuinely does not know Mary's exact height while knowing she is at least of some height; or one may not want to be overinformative because information about a person's exact height is simply not needed in everyday conversation; or one may try to be relevant because a precise figure of Mary's height is not relevant in a particular situation; or finally, one may try to be brief by not mentioning any exact figure.
However Channell, 1994 and Zhang, 1996 for details) . By contrast, we should try to steer clear from using ambiguous sentences.
Finally, here is an overall profile of the four concepts corresponding to the various parameters discussed above, as summarized in Table 2 : Also, fuzzy expressions depend intimately on language users' judgments and cannot be resolved by context, whereas they are compatible with Grice's maxims.
One important point, worth to mention, is that we tend to examine an expression in a uni-dimensional manner, i.e. as either ambiguous or vague. In fact, an expression can be ambiguous, vague, general, or fuzzy, depending on how we look at it. For example, the Chinese word mi3 can be ambiguous, because it has two different senses ('rice' vs. 'meter'); it is general in terms of unspecification of color or shape for rice, and it is also fuzzy, as the reference to rice may not be clear-cut. This indicates that we may have to use a multi-dimensional approach to examine an expression with respect to the four linguistic phenomena.
The task of distinguishing the four concepts is by no means an easy one, as many of the matters discussed here are extremely complex and controversial. The work reported in this paper leave open some questions, for which further research is called.
Conclusions
The discussion in this paper shows that fuzziness, in my terms, has little to do with misuse; it is, indeed, a technical term. Fuzziness differs from ambiguity, generality, and vagueness in that it refers to an indeterminate referential boundary. Fuzziness is inherent in the sense that it is not resolvable, even with resort to context. On the other hand, vagueness, generality, and ambiguity may be contextually resolved, i.e. some readings can be eliminated by their incompatibility with a given context. An implication of this may be that ultimately ambiguity, generality, and vagueness are not as pervasive and important as is fuzziness in the study of meaning.
I also conclude that fuzziness, generality and vagueness are licensed by Grice's conversational co-operative maxims. This opposes the conventional notion that these concepts represent 'bad things' in language, as it has long been taken for granted. In fact, the three are normal and useful linguistic phenomena, rather than abnormal and undesired. All four, and fuzziness in particular, play a unique role in language communication.
Finally, our discussion has shown that some non-linguistic factors (e.g. language users' judgments) also have an important impact on fuzziness. This leads us to speculate that it may be beneficial to not only ask questions about language per se, but to also explore psychological factors. A meaning study would be more adequate if we conduct an integral investigation combining semantics, pragmatics, and psychology. Science B.V. in New York & Amsterdam), 1998, 29 (1): pp 13-31.
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2 Sainsbury (1991) argues that it is inappropriate to say that some concept has a fuzzy boundary, because the term boundary must be understood as a precise one, otherwise there is no boundary at all. Therefore, Sainsbury suggests using boundariless. Nevertheless, it seems to me that something with a fuzzy boundary is not the same as something without a boundary at all. Take about 20 years old as an example; there either is uncertainty about its boundary or there is disagreement on the precise boundary of the concept. That is, whether or not 16 or 26 is within the boundary is undetermined. However, this does not mean that the concept is boundariless, because we would not agree if one says that a one-month old baby is within the boundary of about 20 years old.
3 Expressions in Chinese (Mandarin) are represented in pinyin---a common phonetic system used to symbolize Chinese characters. Also, the number in the end of each syllable denotes one of the four Mandarin tones. Those syllables without a tone mark are neutral tones. The English translation is in single quotes.
4 All we can say here is a trend that an ambiguous expression tends to be given more than one dictionary entry. However, the unreliability of dictionary entries must also be stressed.
5 It should be emphasized that there is some gray area with this kind of test (see Zwicky and Sadock (1975) for details).
6 Precise numbers may be used as approximations, though. For example, I will meet you at two o'clock could mean 'I will meet you at around two o'clock'.
